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I

INTRODUCTION
The State has made two basic points in their brief. First, that the errors were
harmless, or that absent the errors the "defendant would have enjoyed the
likelihood of a more favorable trial outcome." (Appellee Br. at 6, see also pages
3,10, and 16) Second, that the Defendant "opened the door to the subjects]"
(Appellee Br. at. 9 and 14) The Defendant will address these issues in reverse
order.

POINT I

THE DEFENDANT DID NOT OPEN THE DOOR TO THE
SUBJECTS OF THE THEFT OF THE MUSTANG AND THE
FACT THAT THE DEFENDANT'S CHILDREN WERE IN THE
CUSTODY OF DCFS.
A. DCFS custody of the Defendant's children.
The State has made the claim that the Defendant during trial opened the door
to the questioning concerning the fact that the Defendant's children were in the
custody of the Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS). The State claims:
"The matter at issue here came up not during the State's case, but during
defendant's case, while defense counsel was questioning his only witness,
defendant's wife." (Appellee Br. at 8) Although the only time the defense counsel
objected to this area of evidence occurred during the cross-examination of the
defendant's wife, the issue had long before been repeatedly referred to by the State.

Not two pages into the prosecutions opening statement the prosecutor stated: "So
900 Century Drive is in the area of the Offices of Division of Child Welfare,
Family Services..." (R. 074/ pg 7) Both of the officers, who were the only real fact
witnesses in the State's case1, testified that the Defendant was arrested in the area
ofDCFS.
The questioning of defense counsel which supposedly "opened the door" to
the inquiry by the State "Why was the reason [sic] for the trip to DCFS" and
"Where were [the children]" (R. 074/ 69) were some non-responsive answers to
defense counsel questions that merely reaffirmed the fact that the area of arrest was
the DCFS facility, a fact already referred to on numerous occasions during State's
case in chief. Furthermore, the only possible motive of the State's inquiry in to the
reason for the trip to DCFS and the question eliciting the response that the children
were in "State's custody" was to prejudice the jury against the Defendant in a
questionable case.
B. Theft of Mustang vehicle
The State has made the claim that the issue of the Defendant being a suspect
in the theft of the Mustang vehicle was also as a result of the Defendant opening

1

The other two State witnesses Dave Stanger and Julianna Taylor were the
evidence custodian and the criminalist who analyzed the residue.
9

the door. (Appellee Br. at 13) While the State acknowledges that the prosecutor
made reference to the auto theft in his opening statement, and repeatedly during the
testimony of both main fact witnesses, they thereafter claim that the question "In
fact the vehicle was registered to someone else" was permissible since the defense
witness opened the door.
Next, the State takes the position that since defense counsel spends two
paragraphs in closing argument explaining the Mustang, he has invited the error
through trial strategy . Even a cursory reading of those two paragraphs (which is
approximately lA of defense counsel's entire closing argument) reveals that the
purpose of this explanation is to attempt to rectify the misconception that the
Defendant was a car thief.
The reality of the situation is that by the time the prosecutor's line of
questioning to the Defendant's wife arrived, the prosecutor had referenced the theft
of the Mustang no fewer than 11 times. And by the time the defense tries to explain
away the Mustang issue in closing argument it had been referred to by the

0

The State claims: "Here, any improper questioning by the State was more than
overshadowed by defense counsel's own remarks during his closing statement.
Apparently choosing as a matter of trial strategy to defuse defendant's wife's
testimony by explaining it further, defense counsel's closing argument so
overemphasized defendant's involvement in the unrelated car theft case that any
previous mention of it by the State was rendered de mininis by comparison"
(Appellee Br. at 14)
i

prosecutor no fewer than 5 additional times, including twice in closing.

To

maintain that the defendant somehow opened this Pandora's box is to defy reality.
POINT II
THE ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE CONCERNING THE
MUSTANG VEHICLE, DCFS AND THE DEFENDANT'S
HOMELESS STATUS DID PREJUDICE THE OUTCOME OF
THE TRIAL.
The State makes the claim that even if the trial court committed error and
plain error in allowing evidence of the Defendant's homelessness status, the
Mustang vehicle, and repeated references to DCFS, the errors were harmless, since
the proof of guilt was sufficiently strong to warrant a conviction without these
references. Logic tells us otherwise.
A careful reading of the trial transcript reveals that either the trial prosecutor
was unbelievably bumbling and totally detached from reality, or he recognized the
weakness of his case and attempted to bolster that weakness by painting a picture
of a car stealing, child abusing, homeless good for nothing defendant, who among
other numerous failings, possessed methamphetamine. There simply is no plausible
reason to ask questions of the Defendant's homeless status. The State so much as
acknowledges this fact by its failure to propound any legitimate reason in its brief.
Likewise, there is no reason to refer to the alleged stolen Mustang repeatedly
throughout the trial. The lone reason put forth by the State for this evidence is
foundation. The flaw in this logic is that this type of foundational evidence is
4

completely unnecessary, and the danger of unfair prejudice to the Defendant is
enormous. If the trial prosecutor truly used this evidence solely for foundation,
then he laid and re-laid his foundation more often than Appellant's counsel has
ever seen in 18 years of extensive trial practice. Logic and reason guide us to the
only conclusion that the prosecutor repeatedly used the "stolen" Mustang evidence
to prejudice the jury against the Defendant due to his realization of a weak case.
How else can one explain the prosecutor's request to the jury in closing: "And let's
see what we can infer about her testimony there. They don't park at the DCFS
building; they park a block and a half, two blocks away at least."(R. 074/ at 91)
. The repeated references to DCFS throughout trial were a similar attempt to
prejudice the jury against the defendant. Again, no reason is suggested by the State
as to the necessity that this information be presented to the jury. The danger of
unfair prejudice is real, and the prosecution's calculated effect of this evidence is
established by the result.
If there were one or two isolated incidents of this type of evidence during a
lengthy trial, it could be overlooked. But where the bulk of the prosecution's case
rested on these improper inferences rather than on evidence of intent or knowledge
of the possession by the Defendant, justice requires reversal and a new trial. For
the prosecutor to spend 32% of his trial time on this prejudicial evidence is wrong.

5

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the Defendant respectfully requests that this court
reverse his conviction and remand the case for a nevy trial
DATED this ^ d a y of January, 2003. / ., .
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